Trump leaves yet another of his press conferences in which he declares victory over the endless war against Iran

While prediction markets in the United States register a record probability of 39% for the application of the 25th Amendment against Donald Trump, historian and Brazilianist James N. Green, professor at Brown University, classifies such speculations as ā€œscience fiction fantasyā€. ā€œThese are speculations, possibilities that are, for me, science fiction fantasies, and not the current political reality of the Stateā€.

James Green, Brazilianist

In an analysis of American political reality, Green dismantles the optimism of opposition sectors and points out that, without a change in the correlations of forces in Congress, there is no institutional mechanism capable of stopping the president before the November elections.

Prediction markets: thermometer or illusion?

“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day and Bridge Day all together in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the fucking Straits, you freaks, or you’ll live in hell — WAIT! Praise be to Allah,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

The increase to 39% in the probability of applying the 25th Amendment, recorded by the Kalshi market after this controversial post by Trump — with swear words and the religious phrase together — reflects more the anxiety of critics than a realistic reading of the political game. As Green reminds us, prediction markets ā€œoften reflect real-time changes in public expectationsā€, but do not determine the action of institutional actors.

Kalshi is a New York-based ā€œprediction marketsā€ platform regulated by the CFTC (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission), where users trade contracts based on real future events. It allows you to bet on the outcome of economic indicators, such as rising interest rates and inflation, elections, weather, whether a film will be a box office success or whether there will be a strike and other events.

The reaction of Democrats in Congress — such as senators Chris Murphy and state senator Nate Blouin, who called for the amendment to be invoked — serves the role of symbolic pressure. But without Cabinet buy-in or a change in Senate arithmetic, such calls remain in the realm of rhetoric.

Why the 25th Amendment is unlikely

The 25th Amendment allows the vice president and a majority of the cabinet to declare the president ā€œunfit to serve in office.ā€ However, Green remembers that practical application comes up against loyalties and political calculations: ā€œ[o vice-presaidente] JD Vance cannot decree this because it would be seen as a coup d’Ć©tat for him to become president later.ā€ In other words, the vice president would have a personal interest in the removal, which makes the measure politically unfeasible.

As for the cabinet, the situation is even clearer: ā€œThey are the most loyal people, so afraid of Trump, who will never do this.ā€ Unless a documented physical event occurs — such as a heart attack that temporarily incapacitates the president or an absurd situation such as ā€œhim taking off his clothes in publicā€ — there is no realistic scenario for the activation of the constitutional provision.

Impeachment: the Senate’s arithmetic

Even if the Democratic-controlled House were to approve a third impeachment trial against Trump, the outcome would depend on the Senate, where a two-thirds vote is needed for conviction. ā€œThere are not two-thirds of the Senate that will vote in favor of his impeachment,ā€ says Green.

The historian emphasizes that Republicans remain ā€œterrified by the power he has at this momentā€. Even with 60% of the population opposed to the government’s policies — immigration, economy and war — Trump’s electoral base remains between 35% and 40%, enough to guarantee party cohesion in Congress.

November elections: the only real valve

For Green, the only concrete possibility of containing presidential power is through the ballot box. ā€œThe only way to stop Trump, at this moment, is the November electionsā€, he says. If Democrats win a majority in the House and, even by a small margin, in the Senate, they could significantly limit Trump’s agenda in the final two years of his term.

Until then, speculation about early removal fulfills a more symbolic than strategic function: they express frustration, but do not change the correlation of forces. A new impeachment request before the elections is seen by Democrats themselves as a shot in the foot, which would victimize Trump. ā€œPost-election impeachmentā€ is the scenario that the historian considers more plausible — but conditional on a Democratic victory in November.

Popular mobilizations and institutional limits

Green recognizes that the ā€œNo King’s Dayā€ mobilizations indicated ā€œgreat repudiationā€ of Trump’s policies, especially in relation to economic, immigration and war issues. However, street protest does not automatically translate into institutional action. ā€œThey know that there is no point in making accusations without a vote in the Senateā€, he observes.

The tension between public opinion and institutional architecture reveals one of the central dilemmas of American democracy: how to contain a president with minority support, but with dominance over his party and power mechanisms? For Green, the answer lies not in constitutional shortcuts, but in the electoral game and long-term political organization.

Political realism against those who ā€œdaydreamā€

James Green’s analysis offers a necessary antidote to ā€œwishful thinkingā€, the ā€œpure illusionā€ that permeates part of the opposition debate. Instead of fueling expectations of extraordinary removal mechanisms, the historian invites a sober look at institutional restrictions and the centrality of the electoral process.

For those who seek to understand the limits and possibilities of containing Trumpism, the lesson is clear: politics is carried out with a correlation of forces, not with desires. And, until November, this correlation remains unfavorable to the opposition.

Source: vermelho.org.br



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