From the Taiwan issue to the war in the Middle East, the rivalry between China and the United States has come to involve risks that go beyond commercial and technological disputes and can have consequences for international security. For professor Qu Qiang, vice-dean of the School of Journalism at China’s Minzu University, the meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Washington should be understood precisely in this context: not as an attempt to end the rivalry, but to create mechanisms to manage it.
“The most important aspect of this meeting is not that it produced a dramatic breakthrough, but that it helped prevent the relationship between China and the United States from returning to a new cycle of confrontation,” says Qu, in an exclusive interview with Brazil in fact.
The meeting between the two presidents took place after months of trade negotiations and in an international scenario marked by war in the Middle East, tensions surrounding Taiwan and the growing technological dispute between Washington and Beijing. For Qu, this combination explains why the meeting should not be analyzed only by the commercial agreements announced after the meeting. What is at stake is the ability of the two powers to establish limits to a competition that has become structural.
For the professor, maintaining direct dialogue between the two presidents is important precisely because the rivalry between the two powers involves issues that can lead to confrontations and produce consequences far beyond the bilateral relationship.
“The relationship is no longer simply a trade dispute. It now involves tariffs, technology and artificial intelligence, rare earths, the Taiwan Strait, military security and the war in the Middle East.”
Trade and a new interdependence
Among the points discussed are the reduction of tariffs on non-sensitive products, the creation of a bilateral Trade Council, access to the agricultural market and negotiations on rare earths and critical minerals. The two countries also advanced in the dialogue on artificial intelligence.
For Qu, AI presents a particular characteristic: at the same time that it has become an area of strategic competition, it also requires some degree of cooperation to discuss risks and avoid uses considered dangerous. The issue of rare earths follows a similar logic, as China remains central in several global chains of these minerals, while the United States seeks to reduce supply vulnerabilities.
In this scenario, Qu states that the economic relationship should not return to the model of unrestricted integration that marked previous decades.
“The model that is emerging will likely be one of managed interdependence: the two economies will continue to trade extensively, but sensitive technologies, strategic resources and sectors related to national security will remain hotly contested.”
Taiwan: a central issue for Beijing
Among the topics discussed by Xi and Trump, Taiwan occupies a particularly sensitive position. For Beijing, the island is part of Chinese territory and the issue is directly related to China’s so-called fundamental interests.
During the meeting, Xi called on the United States to oppose Taiwan’s independence and treat the issue with caution. Washington, for its part, maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan and continues to supply the island with weapons, while claiming to support peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
For Qu, Taiwan is the point in the bilateral relationship that involves the greatest risk of a possible military confrontation.
“Taiwan is probably the most politically sensitive issue in the entire relationship because, unlike tariffs or agricultural purchases, it directly touches on China’s fundamental interests and the possibility of a military confrontation between China and the United States.”
According to the professor, Beijing’s immediate objective is to prevent further deterioration of the strategic environment around the island. This includes, in his analysis, limiting or delaying new arms sales and preventing measures that could be interpreted by Beijing as support for Taiwan’s independence.
At the same time, Qu notes that Washington also attaches strategic importance to the issue and maintains security commitments with allies in Asia. Therefore, the professor does not expect that a meeting between Xi and Trump will be able to resolve the Taiwan issue.
“The most realistic objective is crisis management: keeping the political and military situation from escalating, preserving space for future negotiations.”
Middle East: war against Iran and Gaza
The war in the Middle East adds another dimension to the rivalry between the two powers. The conflict involving Iran has economic consequences that go beyond the region’s borders, especially due to its effects on energy prices and the security of maritime routes.
During the meeting, Xi and Trump also exchanged views on the Middle East, Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula. According to the Chinese government, Xi supported efforts for the United States and Iran to resume a ceasefire and later move towards a peace agreement.
For Qu, however, “it is unlikely that China will simply become an instrument of US policy towards Iran.” “Beijing has its own interests in maintaining relations with Tehran, energy security and preserving freedom of navigation and regional stability.”
The professor assesses that the Chinese contribution tends to occur through encouraging containment, supporting negotiations and using its diplomatic and economic relations in the region to facilitate communication.
The war in Gaza also remains a major focus of international tension. China advocates a political process and the implementation of the two-state solution as the path to a lasting solution to the conflict. For Qu, the international dimension of the meeting lies precisely in the possibility of establishing cooperation mechanisms between Beijing and Washington on issues in which the interests of the two countries go beyond the bilateral relationship.
“If China and the United States manage to establish cooperation mechanisms on Iran, energy security, artificial intelligence and other global issues, despite bilateral rivalry, this could have consequences far beyond the two countries.”
Latin America: Cuba and Venezuela under pressure
Although Latin America and the Caribbean were not the center of the meeting, the relationship between Washington and Beijing also has an effect on the region.
In the case of Cuba, the context is marked by the tightening of pressure measures from the United States. In February, the G77 + China (UN coalition of developing countries) criticized new measures related to the blockade, including restrictions on oil supplies and sanctions against third parties that maintain legitimate commercial relations with the island.
The issue also involves humanitarian impacts. In June, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said US sanctions were putting lives at risk and called for their suspension.
For Qu, Beijing is interested in preventing the rivalry with Washington from turning into a new front of confrontation over Cuba.
The Venezuelan situation is even more directly linked to the geopolitical dispute. In January 2026, United States forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro during a military operation. The Venezuelan government classified the action as a kidnapping. International law experts have also questioned the legal basis for the use of force.
Months later, the White House itself began to present its policy towards Venezuela in terms of a resumption of the so-called Monroe Doctrine, stating that the Trump administration had “reestablished” the doctrine in the region.
It is in this context that Qu assesses the effects of rivalry on Latin America.
“For Venezuela, the implications are more geopolitical. Washington has dramatically increased its emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, while China has important economic and strategic interests in Venezuela.”
For the professor, a more stable relationship between Washington and Beijing could reduce the risk of Venezuela and Cuba becoming new spaces for direct confrontation between the two powers, although it would not eliminate their divergent interests.
The scenario also has implications for Brazil. China and the United States are important trading partners, and the dispute over Chinese agricultural markets could directly affect Brazilian producers, especially in the soybean sector.
“For Brazil, the most important consequence may be economic, not geopolitical. China is a large market for Brazilian commodities, particularly soybeans, while the United States simultaneously seeks to expand its agricultural exports to China.”
In Qu’s assessment, Latin American countries have an interest in preventing the region from becoming an arena of dispute between Washington and Beijing.
A managed rivalry
Despite the agreements reached, Qu does not consider the meeting to represent the end of strategic competition between China and the United States. What is under discussion, according to him, is the creation of mechanisms capable of preventing rivalry from exceeding certain limits.
“We should not exaggerate the importance of the summit. The fundamental strategic competition between the two countries has not disappeared.”
Therefore, the professor defines the meeting as a summit of stabilization, not reconciliation. “Its success should be measured less by the ability of China and the United States to resolve their differences and more by the ability to prevent those differences from escalating into uncontrollable conflicts.”
For Qu, this is perhaps the main challenge posed by the current phase of relations between the two largest economic powers in the world: managing a competition that is not likely to disappear, but that could produce effects far beyond the borders of the two countries.
“The real meaning of the summit is to know whether the two powers can move from a strategic rivalry without rules to a strategic rivalry with mechanisms for cooperation and crisis control.”
Source: www.brasildefato.com.br
