Published 01/14/2026 20:07 | Edited 01/14/2026 20:08
After more than 25 years of negotiations, the trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union is heading towards completion. With support from Germany, Spain and, decisively, Italy — which obtained concessions such as early access to a €45 billion fund until 2028 — the pact has already overcome the qualified majority barrier in the European Council. Although it still needs ratification by the European Parliament and faces resistance from critical agricultural and parliamentary sectors (as in France, where the opposition is trying to overthrow Macron because of the treaty), the understanding among diplomats is clear: the agreement is about to be signed.
This is an unprecedented economic bloc: 722 million consumers, integrated production chains and mutual access to strategic markets. For many European countries, it is a geopolitical and economic victory. But for the UK, which left the EU in 2020, it is also a painful reminder of what it lost by choosing isolation.
Missed opportunities
Trade deals were a crucial element of the Brexit debate even before the 2016 referendum. The Cameron government noted that 44% of British exports were destined for the EU, while the bloc’s trade deals covered another 12%.
A Financial Times analysis (in 2017) found that there were more than 750 EU treaties that had relevance to Britain and that, after Brexit, would be “lost” – 295 of which were trade agreements. Furthermore, the UK has made more concessions in agreements with important countries such as the US, Australia and India than it would like.
The United Kingdom has shown a strong interest in negotiating a direct bilateral free trade agreement with Mercosur. Official sources indicate that the country is preparing to start formal talks in 2026, seeking even broader terms than the EU agreement. Meanwhile, British exporters continue to face tariffs (such as 28% on cheese) that European competitors will see gradually reduced on trade to South America.
British urgency for an agreement with Mercosur has increased in response to changes in the global scenario, such as the US tariff policy under the Trump administration, which leads the United Kingdom to seek diversification of trading partners.
Brexit: unrealizable promise, bitter reality
Brexit was sold to the British with the promise of full sovereignty and “more advantageous” global trade deals than those allowed by the EU. In practice, almost six years later (completed on January 31), the balance is bleak. The United Kingdom has the worst economic performance among the seven largest economies in the world (G7). Its post-Brexit trade deals are limited: with the US, there is only a modest tariff reduction; with China, a symbolic pact. Meanwhile, around 45% of its exports still depend on the European Union — its main partner, now under stricter and more bureaucratic rules.
They sold an impossible Brexit and delivered one that nobody wants. Not even the most fervent supporters of the exit recognize the “Global Britain” promised in the current regime. And those who voted against Brexit see their worst predictions confirmed: lower growth, labor shortages, high logistics costs and loss of international influence.
The UK economy has been hit with a 25% rise in food prices – a consequence of the extra trade barriers of leaving the Single Market. Furthermore, researchers at the Center for European Reform estimate that business investment was 23% lower than it would have been due to Brexit.
Widespread regret on the streets and in polls
Recent polls reveal a growing sense of regret among Britons. According to surveys by YouGov and the British Social Attitudes Surveymore than 60% of the population today considers Brexit to be a mistake — a significant increase compared to the years immediately following the 2016 referendum. This feeling is especially strong among young people, urban workers and regions economically affected by the new trade barrier with Europe.
Although there is no formal move to return to the EU, the pressure for rapprochement is palpable. The current Prime Minister, Keir Starmer — a name representative of the pragmatic turn in British politics — seeks to negotiate “facilitated corridors” for British products to enter the single market, especially in sectors such as food, energy and technology. However, Brussels imposes clear limits: without adherence to common rules, there is no full access.
On the other hand, a series of cooperative decisions within the European community, from the pandemic to the Ukraine war, would not have been possible with the UK’s influence in the bloc. Furthermore, the bloc’s pattern of expansion towards the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and beyond would not allow the British to re-enter on the terms under which they previously participated, being able to maintain their sovereign currency among other demands for autonomy.
Sovereignty or relevance? The British crossroads
The British case illustrates a contemporary dilemma: in a world of increasingly integrated regional blocs, unilateral sovereignty can mean strategic irrelevance. While the EU moves forward with ambitious agreements — with Mercosur, but also with India, Mexico and Asean — the United Kingdom struggles to maintain its position in global value chains.
The irony is cruel: in seeking freedom to close deals, the country has become trapped in low-impact bilateral negotiations, while its former European partners build one of the largest integrated markets on the planet. Given this, regret is not just emotional — it is economic, political and historical.
If Brexit was the 21st century’s greatest act of national self-determination, it may also become its greatest geopolitical mistake. And, as the British saying goes: “You don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone.” The Portuguese equivalent of: “We only value ourselves when we lose” or “If regret would kill…”.
Source: vermelho.org.br