Brazil should not give in to Trump: those who make agreement with tyrant can lose losing

The 50% rate imposed by Donald Trump on Brazilian products is not just an economic measure, but an attempt to double Brazil by the arm. A multi-layer political embargo that includes the explicit defense of scammer Jair Bolsonaro, the discomfort with the performance of Brazilian justice with the Big Techs and, according to US government interlocutors, the fat eye in the Amazon’s strategic minerals.

Given this, part of the business elite and the traditional press already has a response at the tip of the tongue: “It is better for Brazil to run and close an agreement with the White House.”

The detail, conveniently ignored by these sectors, is that Trump often breaks up on agreements as quickly as he signs them – especially when he perceives weakness across the table.

This is what warned on Monday (28) economist Robert Reich, former secretary of labor in the clinton government: “It’s impossible to make a deal with a tyrant, because a tyrant is never satisfied.”

The phrase may serve as a warning to universities, companies and foreign governments – but it is worth folded to Brazil, which cannot be deceived by fragile promises made under threat.

The idea that an agreement with Trump can guarantee economic stability or commercial predictability does not resist the former president’s own history.

He broke unilaterally treated by him, tore international commitments and used negotiations as a facade for political blackmail. This is not unpredictability – it is method.

The most emblematic example of instability in the agreements signed by Donald Trump is in relations with the neighbors closest to the United States: Mexico and Canada. Still in his first term, Trump tore the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in force since 1994, accusing the treaty of being “a disaster” for industry and US jobs.

After years of threats and renegotiations, he sewed a new pact: the USMC, signed in 2020 as a supposed modernization of the naphtha. Trump celebrated the feat as a “historical victory” and ensured that the new agreement would bring predictability and balance to the continent’s business relations.

But it was enough to go back to power, in his second term, for Trump to simply ignore the treaty he had signed himself. In February 2025, it imposed 25% rates on all imports in Mexico and Canada, claiming that the two countries would be conniving with drug trafficking and illegal immigrants on the southern border.

He also accused neighboring governments of not cooperating with their “national security” policies, a concept that began to use as a generic justification for unilateral actions. In practice, the USMCA was disrespected even before it is five years of validity.

The response of the partners came with indignation and retaliation. Canada retaliated with tariffs about $ 20 billion in American products, while Mexico resorted to the WTO. But the episode had already made clear the trumpper logic: agreements serve only as they are useful to their immediate interests – and can be abandoned without notice, even if signed with pomp and celebrated as national achievements.

Robert Reich summed up this logic well in his latest article: “Trump does not consider agreements as commitments. He sees them as bluffs – until he finds a reason to break.” The experience of Mexico and Canada should be alert to any country pressured to “give in” in the name of stability: with Trump, stability does not exist.

Fragile agreements, permanent blackmail: the case of EU and Columbia

The list of victims of Trump’s coercive diplomacy does not stop in Mexico and Canada. Last Sunday (27), the European Union – pressured by the threat of a tariff similar to the tax to Brazil – decided to give in.

He has accepted a 15% rate on industrial products exported to the US market and, in addition, committed to billionaire counterparts in energy purchases, pharmaceuticals and US military equipment.

The justification was to avoid something worse. The problem is that, as Trump has already shown, there may always be something worse the following week.

The agreement was signed without clear reciprocity and, according to diplomatic sources cited by the Financial Timesunder climate of intimidation. The French and German press dealt with the gesture as an economic capitulation, not as a negotiated solution.

Parliamentarians in Brussels warned that the treaty do not even have solid legal guarantees and that any technical disagreement can become a pretext for new sanctions.

In the internal plane of the US, logic repeats itself. Columbia University, pressured by threats of financing cuts and lawsuits, has signed an agreement with the Trump government to avoid sanctions.

But peace can last shortly. As economist Robert Reich warned, any student protest, critical classroom discussion, or an article published by a student can be treated as “contractual violation.” In practice, Columbia accepted a precarious pact with a government that does not hide its intention to suppress dissent in universities.

Reich was straightforward: “Giving anything to Trump only encourages him to demand more.” What is valid for Rectors also applies to presidents of countries. With Trump, the logic of negotiation is reversed: the more one gives it, the more it is lost.

Lula gets it right to negotiate without submitting – and by building alternatives

The Lula administration has been pressured by several sectors running to an agreement with the United States, as if to give in now it could contain the tariff climb and ensure predictability to bilateral trade. But the facts indicate the opposite: those who give in to Trump loses twice – by giving up sovereignty and trusting promises that will not be fulfilled.

This does not mean that Brazil should abandon the negotiation tables. On the contrary: Lula hits the active presence in the global commercial debate, including the United States, demanding respect for international standards and defending the country’s interests. But negotiating is not kneeling. It is necessary to combine political firmness with practical actions to reduce economic dependence.

Some of these actions are already underway. The entry of the Chinese UnionPay flag in the Brazilian market and the internationalization of PIX as an alternative payment system signal that Brazil does not intend to be hostage to unilateral controlled mechanisms by Washington.

At the same time, the government has mobilized legal instruments – such as reciprocity law and diplomatic action in the WTO – to face protectionist climbing based on principles of sovereignty and equality.

The pressure will increase. Trump does not seek partners – seeking subordinates. And any country that tries to please you with unilateral concessions will soon find that, in the logic of trump, there is no good enough agreement, nor sufficiently loyal allied. There is only one permanent requirement for submission. Brazil should not go this way – and so far, fortunately, it has not followed.