Chinese President Xi Jinping waves during the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, November 15, 2022

Almost a year after Donald Trump’s return to the White House, a wave of skepticism sweeps the planet. According to a survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) of 21 countries — complemented by an Ipsos study of 30 nations — the majority of populations believe that China will increase its global influence in the next decade, while the United States is seen as a declining power even by its Democratic and Republican voters.

The study was carried out in November 2025, a year after Trump’s victory, and interviewed 25,949 people in 21 countries, including 15 Europeans (Germany, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) and six non-Europeans (South Africa, Brazil, China, South Korea, the United States and India).

The “America first” logic, which promised to restore America’s greatness, is producing the opposite effect: isolation. Trump, with his threats to allies, attacks on multilateral institutions and punitive tariffs, is perceived as a threat to international stability. “He is betraying allies, destroying alliances and marginalizing diplomacy,” says researcher Pawel Zerka.

A majority of the Global South believes it is possible to maintain relations with both geopolitical poles, Washington and Beijing. In Brazil, similar proportions see China as an ally (27%) as they do the United States (26%), an opinion that may have changed after the attacks on Venezuela. But if forced to choose between one and the other, China comes first. The result? A world that, even without ideological enthusiasm, prefers Beijing’s strategic predictability to Washington’s chaotic unpredictability.

Global South embraces China; Europe distances itself from the USA

The data is blunt. In Brazil, 73% see China as a necessary partner; in South Africa, 85%; in Russia, 86%. Even in countries traditionally aligned with the US, such as the United Kingdom, half the population believes in Chinese advancement. Only Ukraine and South Korea predominantly see Beijing as a rival.

In Europe, the erosion of trust is alarming: only 16% of Europeans consider the US an ally — a drop of 5 percentage points in months. At the same time, 23% believe that transatlantic relations will weaken in the next five years, more than in relation to China. In Ukraine, where unconditional loyalty to Washington would be expected, trust in the US fell to 18%, while the European Union gained ground with 39%. For Kiev, the Chinese decision not to take a clear side in the Ukrainian War and to maintain a commercial partnership with Moscow, contrary to international sanctions, reduces sympathy for the Asian giant.

This disconnect reflects not only Trump’s erratic politics, but also the perception that the US prioritizes unilateral interests over lasting partnerships.

China resists, exports and imposes itself — even with internal weaknesses

While Trump bet that the economic slowdown and housing crisis would make China vulnerable, Beijing surprised. Faced with new American tariffs, he did not back down. He retaliated with precision: he restricted exports of rare earths — essential for US defense and technology industries — and redirected trade flows to Asia, Mexico, the Middle East and Africa.

The result? In 2025, China recorded a trade surplus of more than US$1 trillion — a historic record — even with a drop in sales to the USA. Its GDP grew 4.9%, above expectations, driven by exports of solar panels, electric vehicles, steel and machinery. While Washington talked about “de-risking” (or risk reduction), Beijing demonstrated that the world still depends on its productive capacity.

Read more: China condemns Trump’s tariff threat and defends Iran’s sovereignty

Internally, however, challenges persist: weak consumption, falling investment, local debt and private sector caution. China resists externally, but has not yet converted this strength into a full domestic recovery.

Invest in China? Yes — but under new rules of sovereignty

The question that returns to the markets — “is China investable?” — now receives a nuanced answer: yes, but not like before. Beijing has opened up space for foreign capital in strategic sectors such as industrial AI, automation, clean energy and advanced manufacturing. But under one clear condition: investment must strengthen Chinese self-sufficiency, not create dependence.

Companies like Nvidia and Google remain attracted to the Chinese technology ecosystem, but face limits imposed by both sides of the Pacific. In the US, Democrats and Republicans agree to tighten controls on semiconductors, data and critical infrastructure. In Congress, bipartisan proposals to restrict investments in Chinese technology are advancing rapidly.

Thus, what is emerging is not an abrupt decoupling, but a managed decoupling: slow, selective, but irreversible in sensitive areas.

2026: narrow window for stability — or further escalation

A possible state visit by Trump to Beijing in April 2026 could bring a temporary truce. But the memory of the last presidential visit — in 2017, followed by the 2018 trade war — keeps Beijing on alert. Furthermore, the US midterm elections are expected to reignite anti-China rhetoric, pushing for legislative measures that not even summits will be able to reverse.

Meanwhile, China is advancing its “new productive forces” model, integrating AI, robotics and smart logistics to consolidate its position as the center of the global value chain. Its success no longer depends on Western approval — but on the ability to offer concrete alternatives to the Global South.

A post-Western world is already underway

The numbers don’t lie: 50% of those interviewed see China as having a positive influence on the world — compared to just 48% for the USA, a drop of 12 percentage points in one year. In Brazil, confidence in the US plummeted 18 points; in China, it rose to 68%.

More than a change in perception, it is a change of era. The world no longer accepts the dichotomy “with the USA or against them”. Prefers to navigate between powers, seeking autonomy. And on this new board, China — despite its contradictions — appears as the only viable alternative to the order led by Washington.

Trump may have wanted to make America great again. But what it did was accelerate the end of the American era — and pave the way for a multipolar world, where the Global South has a voice.

Source: vermelho.org.br



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